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The Indian government’s response to multiple separatist and self-determination movements the 
nation has encountered in its sixty-six year history has ranged from violent repression to 
complete or partial accommodation of demands. My research question asks whether the central 
government of India’s response to self-determination demands varies based on the type of 
demand or type of group. The importance of this topic stems from the geopolitical significance 
of India as an economic giant; as the largest and fastest growing economy in the subcontinent, 
the stability of India as a federal republic is crucial to the overall strength of the region. While 
the dispute between India and Pakistan in the state of Kashmir gets international attention, other 
movements that are associated with multiple fatalities and human rights abuses are largely 
ignored. I conduct a comparative case study analysis comparing one movement each in the states 
of Tamil Nadu, Punjab, Assam, Kashmir, and Mizoram; each with a diverse set of demands and 
where agitation has lasted more than five years. By studying verified historical accounts, books, 
journal articles, newspaper reports, census, and survey data from India as well as international 
human rights and terrorist-watch organizations, I will create a matrix that categorizes 
government response by the types of demands and types of groups. I find that not all demands 
for more autonomy within the union are treated the same; in some cases, the government’s 
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Government Response to Self-determination movements: A Case study 
comparison in India 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
This chapter is an introduction to the background and history of India and the factors over 
the centuries that have contributed to the existence of the modern nation today. In this chapter, I 
will discuss the history of India before independence, and the diversity in religion and culture 
that define the nation. This diversity was manipulated by the British for their own purposes 
during their 200-year reign over India, thus setting the stage for discontent and demands for 
separation from the sovereign nation of India post-independence. Although some of these 
differences were manufactured, many of the groups demanding more rights or secession are, in 
fact, legitimately distinct in terms of religion, culture, and language. The central Indian 
government over the years has recognized this in varying degrees. This is evidenced by the fact 
that when the Indian Constitution came into force in 1950, there were 27 states. With various 
reorganizations that will be discussed in detail over the next few chapters, the total state count as 
of the 2011 census was 29 states and 7 Union Territories, with another recent split in 2014 of the 
state of Andhra Pradesh into two new ones. Many of these states were formed after prolonged 
agitations with varying levels of agitation and violence (Appendix 1 maps show the progression 
of state formation in the country). 
In its brief history as an independent nation, India has seen over fifty ethnic movements 
with demands ranging from more state autonomy to complete secession from the country. The 
origins of these movements can be traced back to factors that predate modern India – such as 
pre-existing differences in culture, religion, and language, but which were also made worse by 
British colonial interference in the region’s geography and politics. Before the arrival of 
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European explorers and traders, what is known today as India was a conglomeration of over 600 
princely states and provinces (James 1998). Far from integrating the states into one central 
government, the British used existing local rivalries to their economic advantage, adopting a 
policy of “divide and rule” and pitting various religious, linguistic, and cultural groups against 
each other for the benefit of the colonial empire. This was to have far-reaching consequences for 
the nation; the place of the individual states in British India set the stage for future controversy 
and disputes.  
The first active revolt to British rule came from the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857. The 
immediate cause for the rebellion was that Hindu and Muslim soldiers serving under the British 
were ordered to bite into cartridges rumored to be covered with pig and cow fat – animals that 
are taboo for both religious groups to consume. The rebellion was not well-organized and was 
crushed almost as soon as it began.  Many historians in India see it as the first “war of 
independence.” In 1858, the British Parliament passed the Government of India Act, officially 
transferring power in India from the East India Company over to the crown. This established the 
crown jewel of the British Empire, or “The Raj.” (James 1998). Over the next century, the 
British systematically put in place legal and educational systems, a civil service (Indian Civil 
Service – ICS), a sophisticated transportation and infrastructure via the Indian Railways; all 
designed to help the Raj run smoothly. To date, the railroad system put in place by the British is 
considered one of the most important contributions to Indian society. It physically connected 
parts of the country that were previously very difficult to access.  
The British were not the benign colonial masters that they portrayed themselves to be. 
High taxes were imposed on the public and every form of economic and class oppression that 
promoted British interests was imposed on the local populace. As a result, resistance to the 
3 
 
imperial state grew. The Indian National Congress (INC) held its first meeting in 1885; this was 
a significant development both institutionally and politically as this was the framework of the 
party that would eventually come to rule independent India. In 1906, the Muslim League was 
formed, sowing the seeds for the creation of the country that came to be known as Pakistan 
(Encylopedia Britannica n.d.) With Mohandas Gandhi’s return to India in 1915 and his 
subsequent leadership of the INC in 1921, the nationalist movement in India got a new life. 
Although Muslim nationalism lagged behind by a few years, the movement for a separate 
Muslim nation had already taken root as well. This was in direct contrast to Gandhi’s vision of 
an independent India based on religious pluralism.  
After World War I, the British introduced the Montagu-Chelmsford Reform Act of 1919, 
the purpose of which was to start allowing limited self-government to the provinces. The 
Government of India Act, 1935 introduced additional autonomy for the provinces, including the 
introduction of elections. Both acts granted partial government to the provinces, with the central 
government having over-riding authority over the provinces at any given point in time (Singh 
1961). The division of political authority in this manner deepened already existing class, religion, 
and ethnic divisions and laid the foundation for future conflicts. While the independence 
movement persevered, Indian troops fought under the British flag in both World Wars of the 
twentieth century. In the decades between the two great wars, there were hundreds of protests 
and clashes between the British and those fighting for freedom from colonial rule. Thousands of 
citizens were jailed, including leaders like Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar Patel, and others. 
By the 1940s, Gandhi had established himself as the spiritual and political leader of the 
movement. He was worshipped by the masses as a “Mahatma” meaning “great soul” in Sanskrit. 
He led many non-violent protests, calling upon all Indians to boycott British made goods (the 
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“Swadeshi” movement), to protest the salt tax imposed upon the public, and most famously, to 
join the “Quit India” movement in 1942 (Rao 1972). By the mid-1940s, Britain was heavily 
involved in WWII and incurring severe losses in the war effort. The last decade of British rule in 
India also saw violent clashes between Hindus and Muslims, with great losses in life and 
property. While Nehru was emerging as the political successor to Gandhi in what would become 
India, Mohammad Ali Jinnah was the rising star of the Muslim League, pushing for the creation 
of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.  
When independence arrived in 1947, the country was divided into India, East Pakistan, 
and West Pakistan, the borders of which were drawn almost arbitrarily. The massive population 
transfers that occurred after partition were accompanied by lives lost, property stolen, and other 
horrors. Estimates of lives lost vary from 200,000 (initial British estimate) to 2 million (a later 
Indian estimate) with most scholars agreeing that the number of deaths was close to a million 
(Riedel 2011).  The Muslim majority areas of Bengal were made part of East Pakistan, which 
broke away to become Bangladesh in 1971. The years after Independence through the 1950s 
were full of turmoil with protests and strikes in different parts of the country. Using the 
combination of an iron hand and the States Reorganization Act of 1956, the leaders of newly 
independent India took the approach of dividing the territories of India into states based on 
dominant ethnic and linguistic origins (Encylopedia Britannica n.d.) Such neat divisions were 
counter-productive in many parts of the country because of the large number of diverse 
communities with different histories, languages, cultural practices, and belief systems (Saikia 
2011).  
Understanding the issue of government response is important to scholars of the region 
because of India’s geopolitical significance. As the largest and fastest growing economy in the 
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subcontinent, the stability of India as a federal republic is crucial to the overall stability of the 
region. While the dispute between India and Pakistan in the state of Kashmir gets international 
attention, other movements that are associated with multiple fatalities and human rights abuses 
are largely ignored. In the northeast, India shares borders with China to the north, Myanmar 
(Burma) to the east, Bangladesh to the southwest, and Bhutan in the northwest. China claims the 
Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh as ‘Southern Tibet’ and the state was the stage for a war 
between India and China in 1962. The issue is further complicated by India’s offer of asylum to 
the exiled spiritual leader of Tibet, the Dalai Lama, who escaped to India in 1959. According to 
Tibet’s leaders-in-exile, China’s territorial claim over Arunachal Pradesh is just one more ploy 
on their part to counter India’s support of the Dalai Lama (China's claim over Arunachal Pradesh 
to counter India on Dalai Lama: Pema Jungney 2013). There is evidence of both China and 
Pakistan supplying arms, refuge, and resource support to multiple groups in the northeast 
(Lintner 2010). The different groups fighting for one form or another of self-determination put a 
considerable strain on the democracy. Studying the factors that contribute to different 
government responses will serve, in part, to possibly predicting future trends in this matter. In 
order to understand the Indian government’s response to different movements, I will study 
movements in the states of Punjab, Kashmir, Tamil Nadu, Assam, Nagaland, and Mizoram; each 




Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This chapter is a review of existing literature and schools of thought with regard to 
separatist movements, both globally as well as in India. I start out by providing a global view of 
secessionist movements, how it impacts sovereignty of a nation, and how nation-states tend to 
react. Existing scholarship addresses causes of the rise and fall of movements. However, what is 
not addressed in current literature is the disconnect that occurs in understanding why similar 
demands for more autonomy within the federal republic are dealt with differently.  This study 
will fill that gap. 
In the early, formative years of a nation, there are bound to be movements and demands 
by different groups who experience real or perceived inequities. Even the United States, which is 
seen as a leader in and a proponent of the idea of a democracy around the world, was founded as 
a result of an act of secession from the British monarchy. However, more importantly, it 
experienced a major upheaval in the form of the American Civil War. After the revolutionary 
war, states came together to form a central government, but the powers given to this central 
government were few and limited – defense, regulation of commerce, and foreign treaties. When 
the possibility of abolition of slavery threatened the southern states’ way of life and commerce, 
they formed the Confederacy in order to secede from the union. Until the Confederacy was 
formed, states could legally secede from the union if they did not agree with the central 
government (Livingston 1998). However, Lincoln’s justification of the Civil War clearly stated 
that states should give up this political authority. Undoubtedly, there were economic causes for 
the North to fight to keep the southern states within the union, but many scholars also believe 
that the most violent war of the nineteenth century was spurred by the act of secession, with the 
abolition of slavery as only one of the causes.  
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In a globalized, post-European Union world, the concept of Westphalian sovereignty has 
been questioned and debated in political science and international relations. However, the right 
of a nation-state to govern itself without outside intervention and formal recognition by other 
states still remains at the core of the idea of sovereignty in international law. The principle of 
self-determination, which recognizes the right of all peoples to their own territory, seems to be in 
direct contrast to this. In separatist struggles involving groups seeking to secede from an 
established union, in order for an ethnic or religious group to separate, the wholeness and 
sovereignty of the nation is put in jeopardy  (Knight 1985). Although self-determination 
principles helped colonial states gain their independence, once sovereignty is established, nation-
states do not generally tolerate challenges posed by groups seeking to separate from the union.  
There have been very few instances of peaceful separation of nations - examples of peaceful 
secessions include the separation of Norway from Sweden in 1904, Singapore’s separation from 
Malaysia in 1964, and the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1993 (Mayall 2013). There are no 
other cases in Asia where secessionist movements have been met with kindly.  Even UN 
Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali indicated in his 1992 annual report that secession 
demands were something to be frowned upon, stating ‘if every ethnic, religious or linguistic 
group claimed statehood, there would be no limit to fragmentation, and peace, security and 
economic well-being for all would become ever more difficult to achieve.’ (Ghali 1992). Some 
scholars believe that the economic efficiencies of being a unified nation are greater than that of a 
fractured one (Bolton and Roland 1997) while others believe that nations discourage separation 
unilaterally to build a reputation so that other regions don’t attempt to secede (Walter 2006). 
Seceding regions may also be important for defense, for psychological and historical reasons, or 
for providing economic value to the rest of the country (Bartkus 1999, Coakley 2003).  
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Therefore, there is no reason to believe that India will be any different from other powers 
when it comes to responding to secessionist demands from individual groups or states. While 
stressing that in any demand for secession by an ethnic group, human rights should take first 
priority, scholars (Hannum 1998, Horowitz 2003) propose that the international community 
should encourage the undivided state to resolve secessionist demands by means other than 
outright separation from the state. These may include more political rights, affirmative action 
concessions, and resource sharing.  
Government response to separatist demands 
Scholarship exists on the causes of the rise and fall of different separatist ethnic 
movements in India and worldwide. From a study using Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) data set 
from 1947 to 2005, Cederman et al (2010) concluded that conflict within states occurs because of 
disproportional power distribution, especially when certain ethnic groups are excluded from 
power. Conflict is then more likely to occur when these groups have the ability to mobilize and 
may have experienced conflict in the past (Cederman et al 2010). A global view of self-
determination movements shows that government response varies widely. Canada’s movement 
for Quebecoise sovereignty can be considered as an ethnonationalist movement according to the 
MAR definition. Canada’s French population, feeling threatened by assimilation by the larger 
Anglo community, has demanded separation from Canada at various points in recent history. 
After violence between the Front de libération du Québec and the Canadian government between 
1963 and 1970, the movement has largely remained non-violent with support for separation from 
Canada fluctuating between thirty and fifty percent. The Canadian government initially 
responded with repression when the FLQ took up arms, but has since employed negotiations and 
dialog with the groups seeking sovereignty. However, the likelihood of Quebecoise sovereignty 
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remains low (Laponce 2003). In the case of Northern Ireland, the roots of conflict go back 
centuries, and have religious as well as ethnonationalist overtones. In recent history, the thirty 
year period known as “The Troubles” between 1968 and 1998 saw extreme violence with over 
3600 people killed by the “terrorists” as well as the security forces (BBC History: The Troubles 
n.d.). Over a long drawn-out process, there has finally been peace since 1997 with a power-
sharing agreement having been reached between the main factions the Ulster Defense 
Association (UDA) and the Social Democratic and Labor Party (SLDP) (Ruane and Todd 2003). 
In addition to the ongoing conflict with India over Kashmir, Pakistan has its own set of 
movements being carried out by national minorities and religious sects – Baloch rebellion, 
Muhajir  Nationalism, Sindhi regionalism – each of which is dealt with by the Pakistani 
government with a firm hand (Kennedy 2003). Indigenous movements in Latin America (with 
the exception of Peru) have been successful in creating regional and national federations that 
speak for the rights of native peoples (Yashar 1998, Baud 2007, Jameson 2010). In these 
countries, the indigenous groups have become part of the political process.  
Post-colonial countries such as India inherited borders and divisions created - sometimes 
arbitrarily - by the colonial masters. In order to manage dissent, post-colonial governments 
continued the policy of imposing an artificial national identity as well as emphasizing existing 
ethnic or racial stereotypes and differences (Brown 1988, Thio 2010, Miller 2011, Saikia 2011). 
Coakley (2003) argues that regardless of type of group or demand, most states do not respond to 
demands for ethnic sovereignty by giving up territory. In addition, there are multiple factors that 
constitute a government’s response to an ethnic movement. Many scholars (Stohl and Lopez 
1984, Gurr 1986, Ziegenhagen 1986, Eberwein 1987,  Franks 1989, Hoover and Kowalewski 
1992) maintain that repressive government responses are determined case to case and depend on 
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1) different attributes of the conflict behavior encountered, and 2) the structure of the political 
economy, such as system type, and 3) level of economic development. This view is supported by 
Davenport, who found that conflict frequency, strategic variety of dissent, and deviance from 
cultural norms play a significant role in determining government response (Davenport 1995). 
The use of violence by the dissenters provokes the use of violence by the government – because 
the threat to the government as well as the general population is higher (Hibbs 1973, Duvall and 
Shamir 1980, Gupta et al 1993). After studying 827 political challenges in seven Latin American 
countries, Franklin showed that the presence of violence tends to make the movement ineffective 
and results in repression by the government (Franklin 2009). Governments also lean toward 
accommodation under democratic regimes or when they have recently been criticized for human 
rights abuses while also receiving substantial foreign aid or investment. 
Some scholars claim that the initial response to any kind of autonomy demand from a 
government will always be one of resistance (Saikia 2011, Goertz and Diehl 1992). The state 
will always initially resist re-drawing of state lines, especially if the area of strategic importance 
or if it has rich natural resources. Since independence in 1947, India has contended with ethnic 
movements in many of its states. Some of these movements have been based on demands for 
complete secession from the nation of India – a few key examples being those of the state of 
Punjab to form a separate country called Khalistan, the demand for Kashmir to secede from 
India, and a few other movements in Northeast India that will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
Other movements are those for more self-determination and autonomy within the union – 
examples being those in Tamil Nadu and Mizoram.   
Existing studies of movements within India address causes and the rise and fall of 
movements, but there is a gap in literature studying what factors influence a government to react 
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a certain way. This study will fill that gap by examining government responses on two 
hypotheses: demand-based and group-based. The first will differentiate movements based on the 
type of demand they make. These could be demands for a separate state within the union, 
demands for more resource allocation, or demands for more political rights. The demands in the 
cases of Tamil Nadu, Mizoram, and Bodoland are for a separate state. The Tamil Nadu and 
Mizoram cases are historic studies while the Bodoland agitation is still ongoing. In the case of 
Punjab, the movement started out with the Sikh community asking for more resource allocation. 
When those demands were ignored, it escalated into a conflict for complete secession. However, 
it still fits in the second category of a demand for resource allocation. In the case of Kashmir, the 
populace has asked for a referendum/plebiscite so that they can determine their own political 
future. Kashmir is a case of demands for more political rights. 
The Indian government’s response to the different movements has varied widely. 
Invariably, when the demand has been for secession from the union, the government response 
has been one of violent repression and suppression of the rebellion. However, all cases involving 
self-determination demands do not get equal treatment as one might assume. There has been 
complete or partial accommodation of demands in some (Tamil Nadu, Mizoram) and outright 
rejection (Bodoland) or harsh repression in others (Assam, Nagaland). Based on a case study of 
some of the states that have experienced self-determination, the following section will categorize 
the methodology used to understand government response on a) a demand-based hypothesis and 





Chapter 3: Methods 
This chapter details the methods used to conduct this study, hypotheses, and definitions of terms used in 
the following sections of the paper. I used case study comparison to conduct my study, and selected five 
cases from within India in which separatist struggles occurred or are still occurring. I used previously 
determined definitions of group types and demand types, which are also described in this chapter. 
Case Study comparison: I use case study comparison as my primary research method. 
Secondary analysis of survey data also helps answer some aspects of the research question. 
According to Ragin’s summary of Mill’s method of Agreement, “if two or more instances of a 
phenomenon under investigation have only of several possible causal circumstances in common, 
then the circumstance in which all instances agree is the cause of the phenomenon of interest” 
(Ragin 1987). As a comparative method, case study has been used to validate historical 
generalizations and to provide causal explanations. For example, Barrington Moore compared 
eight major countries in his classical work “Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy” to 
explain the creation of democratic, fascist, and communist regimes. He did this by looking at the 
ways in which modernization and other pre-existing conditions interact to produce different 
political outcomes (Moore 1966).  
According to Ragin, the case study approach works best when the number of relevant 
cases is small and manageable. By nature, case studies involve causal variables that occur in 
combinations. Keeping the number of cases to be studied small helps a researcher in keeping the 
number of possible conditions manageable. There are objections to case study as a research 
method because of its intrinsic lack of control rendering it of lesser scientific value. However, 
proponents of case study emphasize that study of cases provides context-dependent knowledge 
that ‘cannot be solely acquired from predictive theories and universals’ (Flyvbjerg 2006). I chose 
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case study as the ideal method to study my research question because of the unique nature of the 
self-determination movements that occur only in India. The contexts in which these movements 
occur are unique to India and the particular state, and cannot be replicated elsewhere or studied 
in a controlled setting.  
Case selection: India, over the course of its independent history since 1947, has contended with 
ethnic movements in many of its states. The Indian government’s response to the different 
movements has not been uniform or equal. It has ranged from violent repression in some cases to 
complete or partial accommodation of demands in others. This provides a varying number and 
variety of cases that can be studied to help answer the research question. In order to keep the data 
manageable, I will study five movements that have occurred or continue to occur since 
independence. To define major movements, I will limit the study of cases to those where an 
agitation has lasted for over five years. To avoid selection bias, I will choose cases that are 
diverse in their demands as well as in the type of groups making the demands. There is a large 
body of work studying the causes and outcomes of various movements in India. To collect this 
data, I will use various sources such as historical accounts, books, journal articles, newspaper 
reports, census, and survey data among others. To avoid selection bias, data would need to be 
collected over an extensive time-frame. The cases I have chosen span a sixty six year time frame 
since India’s Independence from Britain in 1947. This will ensure that I am not only choosing 
cases from a particularly turbulent time for India. During this time, India has gone from the 
status of a developing nation to one of the fastest growing economies in the world. The states are 
also very diverse – they are not all border states, they range from central, land-locked states to 
border states with strategic international importance. To ensure that I look at most available 
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texts, I will cross-reference existing literature on the topic of separatist demands in India and 
cover most-referenced data sources. 
Hypotheses: 
H1: The government response is based on the type of demand for self-determination.  Franklin 
(2009) and Davenport (2007) are among scholars who believe that the type of demand 
determines the level of repression and type of response by the government.  
H2: The government response is based on the type of group making the demand. Stohl and 
Lopez 1984, Gurr 1986, Ziegenhagen 1986, Eberwein 1987,  Franks 1989, Hoover and 
Kowalewski 1992 are among those who believe that government response is determined case by 
case and one key factor is the type of behavior encountered from the group making the demand. 
Dependent variable: Government response to ethnic movement.  
In studying government response, this study will use Franklin’s (2009) definitions of the four 
kinds of responses:  
Table 3.1: Combination of Government Response types 
 




Tolerating the challenge 
 
No concession or repression 
 
Repressing the challenger 
 
With some concession 
 




Repression is the use of coercion, both violent and non-violent, by the government against 
dissident citizens of its own country. Violence could be police or army action and non-violent 
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repression could include measures to limit the dissidents’ freedom or imposing economic 
penalties. Concessions include actions taken by the government that are consistent with the 
demands of the dissident groups. Tolerance means the absence or either repression or concession 
– in effect, the government ignores the movement and takes no action.  
Independent variables:  
Independent Variable 1: Demand type 
As discussed above, demands for outright secession are almost always dealt with state 
repression. Separatist demands for more autonomy within the union, however, are different from 
demands of outright secession. According to Jean-Luc Racine, the history of complete 
secessionism in India to date is one of failed attempts. The author labels the demands for 
separatism within the federal union as ‘regionalist.’ (Racine 2013). These are demands to re-
draw existing state lines within the nation to form new states and are based on demands by 
minority groups seeking more control over their language, political, and cultural life. Many of 
these demands are based on historical inequities – for example, in the case of Assam, a 
northeastern state in India, the main contemporary separatist group United Liberation Front of 
Asom (ULFA) seeks to restore sovereignty lost when the British annexed the territory as part of 
British India after a war with Burma in 1826 (Prabhakara 2007). Demand types can be 
summarized in the below table:  
Table 3.2: Demand types 
 
Demand for separate state within the union 
 
Demand for greater resource allocation – such 
as river waters, mining rights 
 
Demand for greater political rights 
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Independent Variable 2: Group type 
Throughout this thesis, I will use the terms “ethnic groups,” “ethnonationalism,” and 
“movements.” Employing Chima’s (2010) definition of these terms, an ethnic group is a self-
defined group with a collective conscious based either on objective cultural characteristics or a 
subjective sense of “community.” Nationalism is the politicized sense of collective identity 
shared by members of a polity or ethnic group; ethnonationalism is nationalism based on ethnic 
identity (Chima 2010). A movement is defined as a systematic, organized effort by individuals to 
achieve a common political goal. In this document, when I refer to movements, they are efforts 
by groups of people for various demands based on linguistic, religious, cultural, regional or other 
reasons.  
I will categorize the types of groups using the classification developed by the Minorities 
at Risk (MAR) project. These types are:  
Table 3.3: Group types 




Regionally concentrated peoples with a history 
of organized political autonomy with their own 
state, traditional ruler, or regional government, 
who have supported political movements for 




Conquered descendants of earlier inhabitants 
of a region who live mainly in conformity with 
traditional social, economic, and cultural 





Ethnically or culturally distinct peoples, 
usually descended from slaves or immigrants, 
most of whom occupy a distinct social and 




Culturally distinct peoples, tribes, or clans in 
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heterogenous societies who hold or seek a 
share in state power. Disadvantaged communal 
contenders are subject to some degree of 
political, economic, or cultural discrimination 
but lack offsetting advantages. Advantaged 
communal contenders are those with political 
advantages over other groups in their society. 
Dominant communal contenders are those with 





Communal groups that differ from others 
principally in their religious beliefs and related 
cultural practices, and whose political status 





Segments of a trans-state people with a history 
of organized political autonomy whose kindred 
control an adjacent state, but who now 
constitute a minority in the state in which they 
reside. 
Source: Group types adapted from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) Classification of group types.  
(Gurr 1993)  For purposes of this thesis, I will be using three types of ethnic group classifications 
– the Ethnonationalist, Ethnoclass, and Indigenous. The Assamese, Bodoland, and Mizo 
movements are all examples of indigenous movements. The Kashmir and Punjab struggles fall 
under the ethnonationalist classification, while the Tamil struggle has both ethnonationalist and 
ethnoclass elements.  
Control Variables 











Where in India is the state making the demand 
located? What is the historical significance of 
the region?  
 
Border state Is the state located on a border contiguous with 
another nation? 
 
Dispute with bordering nation over the 
territory 
 
Yes/No - If it is a border state, does India have 





Yes/No - Is the state of strategic importance 




Yes/No - Is there evidence of the movement 
receiving external support such as support 





Yes/No - Besides religion and language 
(referenced above), it is important to study 
whether the movement has gathered popular 
support. Public opinion polls (if available) and 
referenda (if applicable) can provide this type 




Yes/No – What kind of leadership did the 
country have during the time period? Personal 
leadership: Is/was the leader more 
accommodating or less accommodating in 
leadership style? Expert studies of individual 









Chapter 4: Results and Analysis 
This chapter is organized as follows: for each case examined below, I will outline the location of 
the state/region in question, provide statistics such as population, area, and other relevant factors 
such as religious and ethnic groups and languages spoken. Then I will examine each state and/or 
movement for the variables described above and provide an analysis.  
4.1. Tamil Nationalist Movement:  
The state of Tamil Nadu or land of the Tamils lies at the southernmost tip of India (see 
Map 4.1 in Appendix), sharing borders with the states of Kerala, Karnataka, and Andhra Pradesh 
and with the Bay of Bengal to the east and the Indian Ocean to the south.  The capital city of 
Tamil Nadu is Chennai (previously known as Madras). With a population of seventy two million, 
it is the sixth most populous state in the country (Government of India 2011) and is the fourth 
largest contributor in terms of GDP (Government of India n.d.). With an 81 percent literacy rate, 
it has recently emerged as one of the leading states in terms of literacy (The Times of India 
2003). Needless to say, it is an important state in the country.   
Over eighty percent of the residents of the state speak Tamil as their first language 
(Government of India 2011). Today no one questions whether the state is an integral part of 
India. However, during the 1950s and 1960s, the state of Tamil Nadu experienced an ethnic 
movement based on linguistic demands.  The leaders of the movement claimed that Tamils were 
a separate racial and cultural group and deserved at a minimum more autonomy from the capital 
in New Delhi. Some extreme fringes of the movement went as far as to demand complete 
secession to form a separate ‘Tamil Nation.’ The Tamil language is unique in that it does not 
share the common Sanskrit root with any other Indian language. It is considered a Dravidian 
language and uses a different script than the “Aryan” Indo-Germanic Sanskrit based script used 
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by most North Indian languages (Krishnamurti 2003, Kohli 1997).  Historians have not 
pinpointed when the Dravidian peoples arrived in the subcontinent, but there is evidence to 
suggest that they were already there when the Indo-Germanic Aryan peoples arrived in India by 
the fifteenth century BCE (Krishnamurti 2003). Today, there are 61 million Tamil speakers in 
the state (Government of India 2011). 
Tamil nationalist leaders used historic claims that the Dravidian languages, and especially 
Tamil, were indigenous to the region before the arrival of the “Northern Aryans” and their 
domination. Historically, Sanskrit was the language used by the elites – it was only accessible to 
the higher castes, particularly the Brahmins, and it was used to keep the lower castes out of 
literature, education, and other occupations. With Brahmins’ access to education and other 
resources, when the British arrived, they were able to take advantage of the opportunities offered 
by the new invaders (Irschick 1969). There was also a widely held belief at the turn of the 
twentieth century that Brahmins were racially different from the non-Brahmins. Sanskrit, and by 
association, Hindi, were associated with the Brahmins and Tamil and other “regional” languages 
associated with the lower castes (Brass 1990). The anti-Brahmin movement started during the 
British Raj in India, as early as 1916-1929 (Irschick 1969). The British tried to minimize the 
dominance of Brahmins in all the administrative occupations by promoting positions for non-
Brahmins. There was a strong growth of linguistic pride which helped to sow the seeds for a 
separatist movement for the creation of a south Indian state for the “original south Indians;” the 
Justice Party was formed in 1916 and was the first organization to speak for the rights of non-




The original Madras presidency was one of the largest British provinces in British India 
and spanned much of southern India. It consisted of the current state of Tamil Nadu, and districts 
that today belong to present day Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, and Kerala. After independence, 
Madras was made a “Part A” state, ruled by an elected governor and a state legislature. 
Politically, the Congress party had built its base on the Brahmin vote. In the post-independence 
period, Tamil nationalists took advantage of the Congress-Brahmin link to play up the 
differences between the upper and lower castes as well as the north Indian-Aryan domination.  
The original demand of these nationalists, first called the “Dravida Kazhagam” and later 
“Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK),” called for a separate “Dravidistan” – in other words, 
secession from the Indian union of all the south Indian states. Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first 
prime minister, was reluctant to draw state lines along linguistic lines because he foresaw a 
breakup of India if linguistic separation was encouraged. However, the Tamil nationalist 
movement was very strong during this time and garnered extensive public support through their 
principles of social and land reform and eradication of the caste system. This attracted the 
intermediate and lower castes, with particularly great support among the rural population 
(Pandian and Titus 1972).  With pressure mounting from other states, Nehru eventually came to 
see that it was in the interest of the union to concede to some of the demands of this movement. 
After more than half a decade of both violent and non-violent demonstrations, the States 
Reorganization Act of 1956 allowed for the creation of the state of Tamil Nadu with Madras 
(now Chennai) as its state capital (Windmiller 1956). The States Reorganization Act was also 
responsible for the creation of other states along linguistic lines, including Andhra Pradesh, 
Kerala, and Karnataka. In 1959, following a series of anti-Hindi agitations, Nehru assured the 
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Tamil people that Hindi would not be imposed as a national language, and official business and 
governance would be carried out in English.  
Fearing other secessionist demands, the Indian constitution was amended in 1963 to 
include an Anti-Secessionist clause, the purpose of which was to "prevent the fissiparous, 
secessionist tendency in the country engendered by regional and linguistic loyalties and to 
preserve the unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the Indian Union.” (Hardgrave Jr 
1964-1965). Following Nehru’s death in 1964, there was a brief push to make Hindi the national 
language in all states. Many states protested, but Tamil Nadu saw the fiercest protests with two 
students burning themselves to death. The government reacted with violent repression and police 
fired upon protesting students. Official reports place the death toll at 60, while unofficial reports 
claim as many as 300 deaths (Hardgrave Jr 1965, Guha 2005). As the rioting and violence got 
worse, Lal Bahadur Shastri, then prime minister, assured the population that Nehru’s promise of 
non-imposition of Hindi would be honored and made accommodations to ensure Tamil and other 
“regional” languages would be provided co-equal status to Hindi and English. The DMK’s focus 
then shifted from one of Tamil separatism to more practical, political goals. Its main goal 
became defeating the Congress party in the state, which it did in the state elections of 1967, 
winning a clear majority by appealing to the same anti-Hindi, anti-north Indian, and anti-
Brahmin (and therefore Congress) emotions. It gained tremendous prestige during the anti-Hindi 
demonstrations and the Congress party has never since won an election in that state. The state 
has not seen any significant demands for separatism since then. In recent years, Tamil Nadu has 
gone further with solidifying Tamil ethnic sentiments by banning Hindi in schools. Instruction at 
the primary and secondary levels is only offered in English and Tamil. The state has one of the 
highest literacy rates in the country, and educated elites from Tamil Nadu are highly competitive 
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in jobs, both in the private and government sectors. Even with the prevalence of English 
education, the majority of people in the state speak only Tamil (Brass 2010). 
Examining the case of Tamil Nadu for the variables described in the Methods chapter, we 
see that the government initially reacted with repression (no concession) but then conceded to 
some of the demands, although not to complete secession. In fact, one of the consequences of the 
Tamil separatist movement was the Anti-Secession Amendment to the Indian constitution.  
Tables 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 below illustrates the key variables that impacted this case.  
Table 4.1.1 Independent and Dependent Variable behavior in Tamil movement 
Tamil Movement (Independent variable) Government Response (Dependent variable) 
  
Response type: Concession with repression Type of demand: Demand for separate state 
 
Type of group: Ethnonationalist + Ethnoclass 
 
Table 4.1.2 Control Variables in Tamil Movement 








Yes, but does not share a land border with any 
country.  
 


















Yes – Nehru 
 
4.2. Khalistan Movement:  
Punjab (the land of five rivers) is a state in the northwestern region of India, bordering 
the Pakistani province of Punjab to the west, the Indian states of Himachal Pradesh to the east, 
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Haryana to the south and southeast, and Rajasthan to the southwest (see Map 4.2 in Appendix). 
In addition, it also shares a border with the contentious state of Kashmir to the north. Present day 
Punjab has a population of 72 million, with 75 percent of the population who follow the Sikh 
religion. The capital city of Punjab is Chandigarh, which is also a “shared” capital city with the 
neighboring state of Haryana. Both Punjabi and Hindi are spoken throughout the state, with most 
of the population identifying themselves as bi-lingual in both languages, although the Sikh 
population identifies its primary language as Punjabi and the Hindu population primarily with 
Hindi. Although the Sikh population is distributed throughout India, Punjab is the only state in 
the country with a Sikh majority. Punjab boasts a literacy rate of 76 percent, which is slightly 
lower than the national average of seventy seven percent, but higher than its neighboring states 
(Government of India 2011). The economy of the state is mostly agricultural based, contributing 
about 20 percent of India’s wheat and 11 percent of the country’s rice yield (Government of 
Punjab n.d.).   
In the 1980s, Punjab experienced violent extremism with nationalist groups demanding a 
separate country, ‘Khalistan,’ based on the Sikh religion. The Sikh religion can be traced back to 
the fifteenth century when a religious and social reformer, Guru Nanak, founded the religion out 
of disillusionment with both contemporary Hinduism and Islam prevalent at the time. Principles 
of equality, rejection of the caste system and idol worship, and belief in monotheism were some 
basic tenets of Sikhism. Along with the primary beliefs, there was the emergence of a new 
religious script called “Gurmukhi” and a separate religious text called the “Granth Sahib.” The 
Sikh religion was further consolidated and religious practices and rituals put into place by a 
succession of ten gurus (religious teachers) over the next two centuries (Chima 2010).  
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The last guru, Guru Gobind Singh, institutionalized the Sikh leadership into an 
organization called the “Khalsa” in 1699. The Khalsa was intended to form the core of the Sikh 
religion for future generations, and does so till today (BBC 2009).  In the early 1920s, there was 
a reform movement in the Sikh religion known as the Gurdwara (Sikh temples are known as 
gurdwaras) Reform Movement – the goal of which was to regain control of the temples from 
Hindu priests. This led to the formation of two institutions which would play a big role in the 
political changes of the Sikh community in the years to follow – the Shiromani Gurdwara 
Prabandhak Committee (SGPC) and the Akali Dal political party. The SGPC was originally 
created to be an administrative body to help manage the Sikh temples, while the Akali Dal was to 
help organize the Khalsa Sikh volunteers – the Akalis (Chima 2010). These two organizations 
played an important role in the agitation during the 1980s and do today.  
As early as independence in 1947, Sikh leaders demanded a separate state along the lines 
of Pakistan. However, the Sikh political institutions did not have the same political clout that the 
Muslim League did, and the Sikh population was not concentrated in one geographical area to 
allow this to happen (Jetly 2008). When British India was partitioned in 1947, the larger 
province of Punjab was divided into Indian Punjab to the east and Pakistani Punjab to the west. 
There were large-scale population transfers, estimates of which range from twelve to seventeen 
million (Hill, et al. 2008). During this time, Hindus were still in the majority in the state. After 
independence, the Akali Dal was never able to win any elections in the state because the 
Congress party still had the majority of the Hindu vote. Therefore, for political purposes, the 
Akali Dal led protests in the 1950s and 1960s demanding a “Punjabi Suba,” or Punjabi-speaking 
province. The result was the Punjab Reorganisation Act of 1966, which led to the splitting of the 
state into Punjabi-speaking Punjab and Hindi-speaking Haryana. The thriving city of Chandigarh 
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was contested over by both states; it was therefore made into a Union Territory serving as capital 
of both states (Government of India n.d.). Parts of the erstwhile Punjab state were also merged 
with Himachal Pradesh. A Union Territory differs from a state in that it is governed directly by 
the central (Union) government of India, whereas a state, as defined above, has its own elected 
governor and state legislature. A state, by definition, has more autonomy in the running of its 
own affairs. The sharing of river waters was another grievance that came out of the 
reorganization of the state – a large section of the population of Punjab felt that the waters of 
three of the five rivers that were “theirs” were being unfairly distributed to other states (Jetly 
2008). Both the issue of Chandigarh and the sharing of water resources would become a major 
bone of contention as the Punjab crisis deepened.  
By 1966, Nehru’s daughter Indira Gandhi was in power in the federal government. Even 
with the re-organized states, the new state of Punjab only had a slight majority of 54 percent 
Sikhs. The Akali Dal did not have the support of the elite Sikh population and the Congress party 
was able to cobble together enough electoral votes to continue to dominate elections at the state 
level. Between 1975 and 1977, Indira Gandhi instituted one of the most controversial edicts of 
her reign – The Emergency. During this twenty-one month time period, severe restrictions on 
civil liberties were put in place, Mrs. Gandhi’s political opponents were arrested, and there were 
innumerable human rights violations perpetrated on both the general public as well as political 
rivals. Punjab was one of the nine states where central government rule was imposed and Mrs. 
Gandhi used divide and rule tactics, manipulating existing communal differences for political 
purposes (Blair 1980, Jetly 2008, Steinberg 2005).  Mrs. Gandhi was defeated in the elections in 
1977, but came back to power in 1980.  
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During the late 1970s, Mrs. Gandhi had started nurturing a young, radical preacher 
named Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale as an opponent to the more moderate Akali Dal party in the 
state. This would turn out to be a mistake in the long run as Bhindranwale had a following of 
extremist elements in the Sikh community, who increasingly believed that taking up arms was 
the best way to accomplish the Sikh community’s goals (Kohli 1990). Alarmed by the growing 
popularity of Bhindranwale and his extremist supporters, the Akali Dal published a resolution 
called “The Anandpur Resolution,” which focused on the economic concerns of the Sikh 
population. It did not include secessionist demands, but rather asked for more political and 
economic autonomy for the Sikh and Punjabi communities, the transfer of Chandigarh to Punjab 
as its capital city, and a more equitable distribution of river waters. Kohli (1997) believes that 
this was a crucial missed opportunity, where some concessions might have led to compromise. 
But rather than compromise, Mrs. Gandhi doubled down on her efforts, and this in turn provided 
the extremist elements in the state more fodder to start framing what until that point had been 
economic and resource demands in religious terms (Gupta 1985). The moderate voices were 
effectively silenced as the demands for complete secession of Punjab from the country got 
louder.   
Bhindranwale and the extremist fringe of Sikh politics became stronger and there were 
almost daily attacks on police, political leaders, and the general public. By this time, he had 
turned against Mrs. Gandhi and had turned into a menace for the government and law 
enforcement professionals. His cadres of armed young men were exhorted to take up arms 
against all “enemies of the Sikh religion.” A state of Emergency was declared in Punjab on 
October 6, 1983. In order to hide, Bhindranwale and his associates took refuge in the Golden 
Temple in Amritsar, one of the holiest sites for the Sikh religion. In an operation called 
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“Operation Blue Star,” the Indian army was called out to remove the armed extremists from the 
temple. The government first tried cutting off food and water supplies to the holed-up extremists; 
when that did not produce any results, a gun battle followed. In the fighting that followed over 
three days (June 3-6, 1984), hundreds of lives were lost, both civilians and extremists, and there 
was considerable damage done to the temple. Official estimates put the death toll at 575, but 
unofficial estimates claim as many as 3000 lives were lost. Bhindranwale was one of the 
casualties of this operation (BBC 2014). If there were any moderate voices left by this time, the 
anger over the storming of the Golden Temple silenced them and the movement picked up more 
steam.  
The violence escalated to unprecedented proportions and according to some estimates, 
there were anywhere from twenty-five thousand to forty-five thousand lives lost (Singh 1996). In 
October of 1984, Mrs. Gandhi was shot by her own Sikh bodyguards; this was met with what 
some claim to be Congress-supported riots where innocent Sikh civilians were attacked around 
the country (People's Union for Civil Liberties 2003). After her death, Mrs. Gandhi’s son, Rajiv 
Gandhi came to power. Rajiv was initially more amenable to compromise and committed to 
resolving the Punjab crisis. He made great progress in negotiating with the Akali leadership, and 
was successful in signing an accord known as the “Rajiv Longowal” accord on July 24, 1985, the 
other chief signee of which was the moderate Akali leader Sant Longowal. Akali leadership 
encouraged the Sikh populace to live peacefully with their Hindu neighbors, and for the 
government promised to resolve the issues of Chandigarh and  the sharing of river waters. 
However, Longowal was killed within two weeks of the signing of the accord and his successors 
were unable to carry forward the negotiations with the central government. For a brief period, 
however, there was a dramatic drop in violence and elections were held in the state and the Akali 
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Dal won a majority in the state for the first time. However, Rajiv Gandhi’s administration did not 
follow through on implementing many of the promises made in the accord and the violence 
resumed (Telford 1992).  
The violence escalated in the state in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, with a peak of 
4000 lives lost in 1990 alone (Kohli 1997). The central government responded with violent 
repression by carrying out a series of military operations (Jetly 2008). The movement also got 
support in the form of money and arms, not only from the extensive Sikh diaspora living abroad, 
but also from the neighboring nation of Pakistan (India, Government of 1984). There were also 
some Chinese-manufactured automatic weapons recovered from the captured and dead militants, 
indicating China’s support of the movement (Jetly 2008). There was support among the public 
for the movement, with thousands of young men being recruited into the ranks of the militants to 
fight for the cause. The central Indian government made anti-terrorism its main policy in the 
state in the late 1980s and a series of anti-terrorist legislation was passed specifically to combat 
the problem of militancy in Punjab and elsewhere in the country. There was extraordinary 
cooperation between border security, the military, the police, and other reserve forces to tackle 
the violence. In 1992, there were 120,000 army personnel, 53,000 Punjab Police, 28,000 Home 
Guards, 10,000 Special Police, and over 70,000 paramilitary personnel deployed in the state 
(Singh 1996). With this level of heavy firepower, many of the main leaders of the movement 
were eliminated or captured and by the early 1990s, the movement started losing steam. The 
central government, led by Narasimha Rao, called elections in the state in 1992 and a Congress 
party led by Sikhs came into power. Since then the state has gone back to a sense of calm and 
peace with capital investments growing in the state, making it one of the most prosperous in the 
Indian union (Kohli 1997).  
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Examining the case of Punjab for the variables described in the Methods chapter, we see 
that the government reacted with violent repression for the entire duration of the conflict. It is 
hard to predict if the violence would have escalated to the levels it did if the successive 
governments at the center had conceded to some of the demands such as the capital city of 
Chandigarh, the sharing of river waters and more economic autonomy. However, since those 
demands were not met, and the movement escalated into one for complete secession, the 
government reacted predictably by repressing the movement with force. The state also shares a 
crucial land border with India’s most hostile neighbor, Pakistan. The possibility of India granting 
a separate nation of Khalistan to the Sikh community in that geographic region is little to none. 
Tables 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 illustrate the key variables that may influence this case.  
Table 4.2.1 Independent and Dependent Variable behavior in Khalistan movement 
Khalistan Movement (Independent variable) Government Response (Dependent variable) 
  
Response type: Repression, no concession Type of demand: Demand for separate state 
 
Type of group: Ethnonationalist 
 
Table 4.2.2 Control Variables in Khalistan Movement 
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4.3. Kashmir Movement (s):  
The Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir (commonly referred to as just Kashmir) receives 
international attention and media coverage. The dispute between Indian and Pakistan over this 
territory began almost simultaneously with independence and Partition. The state has a 
population of 12 million (Government of India 2011), and the state is unique in that it is divided 
into Jammu, the Kashmir Valley, and the mountainous Himalayan region of Ladakh. The 
northern parts of Kashmir, indicated by a different color on Map 4.3 in the appendix, are 
controlled by Pakistan (also called “Azad” or Free Kashmir). Srinagar serves as the state’s 
summer capital and the city of Jammu serves as the winter capital. Kashmiri, Urdu, and Hindi 
are all listed as “official” languages of the state. The population distribution of this state is also 
very unique:  Table 4.3.1 illustrates this distinction.  
Table 4.3.1 Population distribution in regions of Jammu and Kashmir 
Indian-administered Kashmir 
Region Buddhist Hindu Muslim Other 
Kashmir Valley - 4% 95% - 
Jammu - 66% 30% 4% 
Ladakh 50% - 46% 3% 
Pakistan-administered Kashmir 
Region Buddhist Hindu Muslim Other 




- - 99% - 
Source: BBC Profile of Kashmir: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/south_asia/03/kashmir_future/html/  
Before the insurgency in the region intensified in 1989, tourism was a major contributor 
to the state’s economy. Tourism has taken a hit in the state in recent decades, with most western 
nations advising their citizens not to travel there (US Department of State 2014, UK Government 
2014). As with the case of Punjab, the state’s woes began with the British partition of India. At 
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the time of partition, the state was given the option of being part of secular India or Muslim 
Pakistan. The Hindu maharaja (king) of Jammu and Kashmir, Hari Singh, chose to join India, the 
result of which was contested both by Muslim Kashmiris as well as Pakistan. According to 
Varshney (1991), the Kashmir problem is a complex combination of secular nationalism 
(represented by India), Muslim nationalism (represented by Pakistan), and “Kashmiriyat,” a 
unique ethnic nationalism claimed by Kashmiris. Pakistan has always claimed that the Muslim 
majority state should have gone to it. India’s argument is not as simple as that – India never 
accepted the two-nation theory and has espoused a multi-ethnic, secular nation where all 
religions and ethnicities should live together in harmony, at least in theory. Kashmiri nationalists 
use the concept of “Kashmiriyat” to claim that they should be their own state – independent of 
both India and Pakistan (Rizvi 1992). At independence, Kashmir was accorded “special status,” 
giving it substantial autonomy within the Indian union and the central government provided 
subsidies to the state to help its development (Kohli 1997). 
It is important to describe the concept of “Kashmiriyat” because it is quite unlike any 
other known perceptions of religious or racial differences. The people of Kashmir – Hindu, 
Muslim, and Buddhist conform to the idea that Kashmiris are quite different from both Indians 
and Pakistanis. It is a difference based on social consciousness and cultural values of the people 
of the state, characterized by harmony among all the religions, co-existence and patriotism for 
Kashmir, not India and Hinduism or Pakistan and Islam. The different religious communities 
lived together in harmony for centuries before colonialism and the horrors of Partition created 
divisions that were unheard of before. The region has always been significant for many religions, 
with many sites of pilgrimage and reverence. Kashmiriyat has its origins in the sixteenth century 
when the Mughal emperor Akbar promoted equality and respect for all religious and ethnic 
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groups (Nayak 2003). There are some common rituals and customs followed by all religious 
groups living in the state, and a common language binds them together (Punjabi 1990). A 2007 
poll conducted by the Center for Developing Studies in New Delhi found that eighty four percent 
of the people of Kashmir want to see the return of the Hindu Kashmiri Pundits who have been 
driven out of the state due to the violence and eighty-seven percent want independence from both 
India and Pakistan (Reuters 2007). Another survey found that an overwhelming ninety-two 
percent of the population does not want to see the state divided on religious lines (The Milli 
Gazette 2002).  
The newly independent countries fought their first battle over the state almost overnight 
after partition. Armed Pashtun tribes from the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan 
entered Kashmir. Maharaja Hari Singh appealed to India for assistance and signed an instrument 
of accession with the Indian government and the National Conference, the prominent political 
party in Kashmir at the time. Sheikh Abdullah was the leader of the National Conference at the 
time and was held in great regard by all Kashmiris. The larger Indian army pushed the Pashtun 
invaders back and a line of control (LOC) was established. The Gilgit-Baltistan region to the 
north and the Azad Kashmir region to the west were effectively under Pakistan’s control. 
Abdullah took over as Prime Minister of Kashmir in 1948 (Varshney 1991) (Pardesi and 
Ganguly 2010). During Jawaharlal Nehru’s era (1947 to 1964), there were some indications that 
a compromise with Pakistan might be reached. Although initially opposed to the idea of the two-
nation state, Nehru did not want to hold on to Kashmir against the will of the Kashmiri people. In 
1953, he even agreed to hold a plebiscite to settle the issue and agreed to it in discussions with 
Mohammad Ali Bogra, Pakistan’s Prime Minister at the time. However, after the agreement was 
reached, there was procrastination on Bogra’s end, the reasons for which are not clearly known. 
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By this time, India was getting increasingly concerned about Pakistan’s growing military 
alignment with the United States. Nehru, a staunch believer in the idea of non-alignment during 
the Cold War, took the position that Pakistan had to choose between an amicable settlement on 
Kashmir or go ahead with the military affiliation with the US. In Nehru’s view, that brought the 
Cold War, and the possibility of real war too close to India. He said in his communication to 
Bogra, “it is not for us in India to come in the way of Pakistan’s foreign or internal policy. But, 
when we are affected by it powerfully, we cannot ignore it… If such an alliance takes place, 
Pakistan enters definitely into the region of cold war. That means to us that the cold war has 
come to the very frontier of India. It means also that if real war comes, this also reaches the 
frontier of India.” The US, in its zeal to contain communism, went forward with the alliance with 
Pakistan, thus alienating India (Rizvi 1992).  
Between the early 1950s and 1964, the relationship between Sheikh Abdullah and Nehru 
soured with the former visiting Pakistan as that country’s state guest and starting to speak louder 
for the cause of self-determination for Kashmir. In 1953 he was dismissed as Prime Minister of 
Kashmir, and arrested and jailed for eleven years on charges of conspiracy against the Indian 
state, and was finally released in 1964. In 1962, India had just gotten out of a conflict with China 
over the Siachen Glacier region - indicated in Map 4.3 in the appendix as Aksai Chin - when 
China took control over a part of Northern Kashmir. The Kashmir Valley saw some anti-India 
protests of a religious nature in 1963. Pakistan took this as a sign that the population of Kashmir 
was ready for an all-out rebellion against India and in 1965, launched Operation Gibraltar, 
designed to take over the remaining portions of Jammu and Kashmir (Ganguly 1996). Nehru and 
Sheikh Abdullah reconciled before Nehru’s death in 1964. By 1965, Lal Bahadur Shastri was the 
new Prime Minister of India. Pakistan counted on a weakened India after the China conflict and 
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more importantly, the population of Kashmir rising up in rebellion and helping make the 
incursion a success. When that did not occur, the operation failed (The Tribue Online Edition 
2005). India launched a full-scale attack on Pakistan and after seventeen days of fighting, the 
second Indo-Pakistan war was over. A peace accord was signed between the two countries in 
Tashkent, USSR. Shastri died of a heart attack in Tashkent the very next day after the accord was 
signed. Indira Gandhi came to power in 1966 after Shastri’s death.  
The third conflict between India and Pakistan had nothing to do with Kashmir, but it had 
important consequences for the state. In 1971, India intervened in the conflict between East and 
West Pakistan, supporting the East which ended up becoming the nation of Bangladesh. Pakistan 
experienced a humiliating defeat both in terms of military losses as well as the loss of territory. 
Alarmed by the violence, Sheikh Abdullah made a compromise with Indira Gandhi, giving up 
the demand for a plebiscite and settling for the right of the Kashmiri people to govern themselves 
by a democratically elected government. Sheikh Abdullah was elected as the Chief Minister of 
the state (Bose 2003).  
During the 1970s and up until 1982, relative calm prevailed in the state. The popular 
Kashmiri leader Sheikh Abdullah died in 1982, leaving his son, Farooq Abdullah to fill his 
position as the leader of the National Conference party and Indira Gandhi’s rival in the state. 
Farooq Abdullah won the state-level elections by running on an anti-Congress, pro-Kashmiri 
platform. He had to be very careful to seem Kashmiri, but not to sound secessionist. However, 
his growing popularity in the state threatened Indira Gandhi, and she appointed Jagmohan, a 
Hindu, as governor of the state. In a calculated political move that angered Kashmiri Muslims, 
Jagmohan, an un-elected official who was seen as the central government’s puppet, dismissed 
Farooq Abdullah from the Chief Minister position in 1984. There was a growing anti-India 
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sentiment and Kashmiri Muslims felt increasingly alienated. As has already been mentioned, 
Mrs. Gandhi was assassinated in 1984, bringing her son to power as Prime Minister at the center. 
By the time the 1987 state elections came around, Farooq Abdullah, in a politically 
opportunistic, but bizarre turn of events formed an alliance with the Congress party (now led at 
the center by Indira’s son Rajiv Gandhi) in order to win elections in the state. The alliance won 
the elections, which were widely rumored to be rigged. This further alienated the Kashmiri 
Muslim populace and they started viewing both their state government as well as the Indian 
government at the center as hostile.  
By the late 1980s, the Soviet Union had invaded Afghanistan and the US had started re-
arming Pakistan. Kashmir exploded in militant violence in 1989, with hundreds of young men 
being trained by Pakistan across the border and sent into the state. Both India and Pakistan are 
now nuclear-capable, which, according to some deters a full-scale war between the two 
countries. However, the fighting has not stopped by any means. In 1999, there was a fourth war 
known as the Kargil War between the two nations, thus called for the Kargil district of Kashmir 
where infiltrators from Pakistan made another attempt to “liberate” Kashmir. Pervez Musharraf 
of Pakistan, who took over the presidency after a coup, used Pakistani troops during this conflict 
(Riedel 2011). There have been several overtures towards peace, some initiated by both 
countries, and others due to pressure from the international community. However, Pakistan 
continues to use the notorious Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) to train militants and to 
perpetrate attacks on India, the most obvious of which was the attacks on Mumbai in November 
2008.  Diplomatic pressure on both countries, but especially Pakistan, has increased, especially 
in light of the Mumbai attacks. After Kargil, the US held Pakistan solely responsible for the 
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conflict and the Clinton administration pushed for a complete withdrawal of Pakistani troops 
from the region back to the 1947 LOC (Riedel 2011).  
Thousands of lives (some estimates as high as 40,000) have been lost and over 100,000 
Hindus have migrated out of the state. The main conflict is between state security forces using 
violent force and Islamic militants who receive material and training support from Pakistan 
(Kohli 1997, Saikia 2011).  South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), an organization that tracks 
militant activity in the region, lists thirty-two active terrorist groups, most of which get support 
from Pakistan in the form of arms, training, and other resources (South Asia Terrorism Portal 
2014).  The conflict continues over the territory, with seemingly no end in sight.  Although it 
remains to be seen how this issue will play out, Tables 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 illustrate the important 
dimensions that may influence the Kashmir case.  
Table 4.3.2 Independent and Dependent Variable behavior in Kashmir movement 
Kashmir Movement (Independent variable) Government Response (Dependent variable) 
  
Response type: Repression, no concession Type of demand: Political rights in form of plebiscite, 
separate nation of Kashmir 
 
Type of group: Ethnonationalist 
 
Table 4.3.3 Control Variables in Kashmir Movement 








Yes – shares border and violent history with 
Pakistan and China 
 










Yes – primarily from Pakistan. Some evidence 










4.4. Northeastern India:  
India’s Northeastern region is made up of eight states: Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, 
Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim, and Tripura (see Map 4.4 in Appendix). 
These states were originally known as the ‘Seven Sisters’ – Sikkim was recently added to the 
list. The eight states are connected to the mainland by a narrow corridor known as the Siliguri 
Corridor – more commonly known as the ‘Chicken’s Neck,’ which is only 22 kilometers long.  
All these states have seen their share of ethnic movements. The varying levels of insurgency in 
this region began almost immediately following independence.  Table 4.4.1 illustrates the 
number of separatist groups operating in these states: 
Table 4.4.1 Number of separatist groups in Northeastern Indian states 





























Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal: http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/terroristoutfits/index.html   
Each state and movement within the state presents a dizzying array of demands. It is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to analyze every single one. Therefore, for purposes of this 
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research, I will address the states of Mizoram, Assam, and Nagaland. However, I present this 
table to indicate the level of strife in the northeastern part of India.  
4.4.1. Assam and Bodoland 
Assam is a state in the northeastern region of India, surrounded by seven Indian states 
and two countries, Bhutan and Bangladesh. Assamese is the major language of the State. The 
other recognized Indian languages spoken in the state include Bengali and Hindi.  The 
population of the state is thirty-one million. Assamese-speaking Hindus represent two-thirds of 
the state's population and indigenous Tibeto-Burman tribal groups are estimated to make up 
another 16 percent of the total. More than 40 percent of Assam's population is thought to be of 
migrant origin, with migrants from Bangladesh entering the region. The term "Assamese" is 
often used to refer to those who are citizens of Assam. Native Assamese, Mymenshingy settlers 
from Bangladesh, and tea-garden laborers are thus included in its population. Assam has twenty 
three tribal groups constituting 13 percent of the population. The groups vary in size, spatial 
distribution, dialects, culture, and ways of life.  There are other tribal groups within the state. The 
Bodos are the largest group, at 44 percent total tribal population of the state; the Misings are 
about 16.3 percent and the Dimasas at 2.3 percent (Government of India 2011).   
The identification of the different populations of Assam began during the colonial period 
when the British characterized northeast areas as “excluded territories” and the people as 
“backward” or “forest” tribes. This set in motion a pattern of isolationism and economic 
regression for the tribal groups. They also characterized different groups of people as Indo-
Aryan, Indo-Mongoloid and others, sowing the seeds for discontent and mistrust for decades to 
follow.  These groups felt discriminated against in colonial and post-colonial India. In 1956, the 
Indian state labeled these groups as Scheduled Tribes and conferred on them special concessions 
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and privileges such as reservation of seats in educational institutions, government, and 
employment. All three groups – Bodos, Misings, and Dimasas have common lineage. They 
belong to the Indo-Mongoloid race, and share common ethnic origins. Their language is based on 
Tibeto-Burmese group of languages, and is very different from Assamese and Hindi. Bodos 
occupy the Western and Central areas of Assam, Dimasas the southern area, and Misings 
Northeastern Assam.  In addition to political and economic grievances, these groups have 
expressed their grievances in cultural policies as well since the 1950s. The Misings want a larger 
autonomous region in the northeastern part of the state. The Dimasas want a separate state called 
Dimaraji in the southern areas in the North Cachar hills. The Bodos want a separate state in 
Assam’s western boundaries (Saikia 2011).  
According to the South Asian Terrorist Portal (SATP), an online repository about 
“terrorism, low intensity warfare and ethnic/communal/sectarian strife in South Asia,” there are 
at least 36 known groups in the state of Assam alone. The beginning of strife in Assam has its 
roots in the 1970s as an anti-immigrant agitation started by politically active students to detect 
and deport Bangladeshi immigrants. The movement took a violent turn and the United Liberation 
Front of Asom (ULFA) was formed in 1979 (Kikon 2009). Over the period of 1980-1983, 
several talks were held between the government of India and the leaders of the agitation in 
Assam, with little to no headway made. On February 18, 1983, a decision by the Indian 
government to hold elections in the state led to one of the bloodiest massacres took place in the 
village of Nellie, with some reports claiming up to 3000 dead in a period of six hours, the 
majority of the victims being immigrants from Bangladesh (Sen and Shourie 2006). It is 
noteworthy that most of the immigrants were Muslims, giving a religious bent to the issue.  
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In 1985, the Assam Accord was signed by the prominent leaders of the agitation and 
newly elected Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. The terms of the accord established that all 
“foreigners” who entered Assam after March 25, 1971 were to be detected and deported. 
Prominent leaders of the agitation entered the political fray and won elections at the state level 
(Assam Administrative Staff College 1999). At this point, ULFA changed its basic objective to 
“liberate Assam from Indian colonial rule and to form a sovereign, socialist Assam through 
armed struggle.” According to some reports, by 1986, ULFA had established contacts with 
agents in Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), as well as other insurgent groups in the 
northeast. Between 1990 and 1991, the federal government sent the army into the state and 
launched a large-scale operation to flush out terrorists. During this operation, over two hundred 
militants were arrested and a large quantity of arms and proceeds of extortion were recovered.  
However, ULFA continued its activities and has since widened its network of extortion, criminal, 
and quasi-legal operations in the state (South Asia Terrorism Portal 2014).  
ULFA established camps in Bhutan in the 1980s; it also ran lucrative businesses in the 
names of local Bhutanese citizens. In December 2003, the Bhutanese and Indian armies in a joint 
exercise, moved against some of these operations and drove them out. This operation meant the 
loss of arms and ammunition for the insurgents. As mentioned above, ULFA was born out of a 
nationalist movement to expel illegal Bangladeshi immigrants from Assam. Pakistan’s ISI used 
Bangladesh as a base to assist ULFA’s activities until 2010 – the idea being that distracting the 
Indian forces to the northeast would take resources away from the more important struggle in 
Kashmir, in which Pakistan has more interest. This link suffered in 2008 when Bangladesh 
elected Sheikh Hasina to the Prime Minister’s office – Hasina’s administration started 
cooperating with Indian authorities by arresting several leaders of ULFA and deporting them to 
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India (Lintner 2010). ULFA started establishing its presence in Burma in the 1990s and it 
continued till 2007, when its leaders were being arrested and deported to India. A large amount 
of trade in Chinese arms occurred during this time frame (Lintner 2010). Unlike Pakistan and 
China, Burma has no territorial claims in India’s northeast. However, its military junta prefers a 
buffer of instability between Burma and India – this keeps Burma from having to police an 
extremely remote part of its country to keep India at arm’s length (Lintner2012). 
Assam has also seen an emergence of Bodo insurgency in the state.  Among the tribal 
conflicts, the Bodo insurgency has turned the most violent, with multiple groups fighting for 
anything from a separate Bodoland within the Indian union to an “independent Bodo nation.” 
The National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) has carried out killings, explosions, arson, 
and attacks on police stations in their quest for a separate Bodo nation independent of India. 
Another group, the Bodo Liberation Tiger Force (BLTF) has been fighting for a state within the 
Indian union. In 1993, an accord was signed between the Indian government, the state 
government of Assam, and Bodo leaders, creating the Bodoland Autonomous Council (BAC) 
within Assam, giving the community some level of autonomy within the union of India. The 
various Bodo groups fighting for autonomy still want a separation from the state of Assam. 
However, since Bodo lands are not contiguous within the state, the demarcation of this council’s 
jurisdiction has been problematic to date (South Asia Terrorism Portal 2014). How the particular 
case of Bodoland plays out in the near future is worth watching and studying over the next few 
years. Tables 4.4.2 and 4.4.3 illustrate the key variables that may influence this case.  
Table 4.4.2 Independent and Dependent Variable behavior in Assam movements 
Assam Movement (Independent variable) Government Response (Dependent variable) 
  




Type of group: Indigenous 
 
Table 4.4.3 Control Variables in Assam movements 








Yes – shares borders with Bhutan and Bangladesh 
 






















Mizoram (the land of the Mizo tribe) is the southernmost state in the northeastern part of India, 
sharing borders with Bangladesh and Burma and the Indian states of Tripura, Assam, and 
Manipur. The capital of the state is Aizawl and the population as of the 2011 census stands at 
about 10.0 million (Government of India 2011).  The inhabitants of Mizoram are known by the 
generic name Mizo, which means people of the hills. The origin of the Mizos is traced back to 
the great Mongoloid wave of migration from China who moved into India. Historically there has 
been a considerable concoction of different tribes in the State leading to three main sub-groups -
Lushais, Pawis and Lakhers ("CDPS, Mizoram General Overview"). Mizoram was a district of 
Assam until 1972, when it became a Union Territory; with the signing of the Mizo Peace Accord 
and settlement agreement with the government of India, it became a full-fledged state in 1987. 
One of the main factors for the insurgency was the perceived discrimination of the Mizo Hill 
tribes at the hands of the Assamese majority during the days when Mizoram was only a district 
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of Assam. The discrimination claims included unequal compensation at employment, and 
disproportionate representation in government and educational opportunities. The tipping point 
in starting the insurgency was the Mautam famine in 1959, when it was widely felt that the Mizo 
population was neglected by both the Assam and Indian governments (South Asia Terrorism 
Portal 2014).  There was an ongoing insurgency from the early 1960s till 1987 with the violent 
conflict led primarily by the Mizo National Front (MNF). The government adopted a policy of 
aggression until 1987, when the Mizos were finally granted a separate state with the ability to 
elect their won representative government.  
In 1986, the Mizoram Peace Accord was signed between the central government, headed 
by Rajiv Gandhi, and the MNF. Both the MNF and the Indian government made major 
concessions with the MNF agreeing to work within the framework of the Indian Constitution and 
the central government acknowledging the legitimacy of the grievances brought by the insurgent 
group (Economic and Political Weekly 1986). The subsequent years saw the former insurgent 
leaders being absorbed into the political arena in the state and Mizoram has not seen any 
insurgent activity since then. Following that, Mizoram has remained more or less, peaceful, 
except for peripheral conflicts ("CDPS, Insurgency and Peace Efforts in Mizoram”). The 
intermittent incidents of violence that do occur today involve terrorist outfits whose primary area 
of operation is outside the state of Mizoram, but have a presence in the state. With a literacy rate 
of ninety two percent, the state is the second most literate in the country (Kerala being the first at 
almost 98 percent), in stark contrast to seventy-two percent for Assam and seventy-five percent 
for the national average for India.  Tables 4.4.4 and 4.4.5 illustrate the key variables that may 




Table 4.4.4 Independent and Dependent Variable behavior in Mizo movement 
Mizo Movement (Independent variable) Government Response (Dependent variable) 
  
Response type: Concession with some 
repression 
Type of demand: Separate state within union 
 
Type of group: Indigenous 
 
Table 4.4.5 Control Variables in Mizo Movement 








Yes – shares border with Burma and Bangladesh 
 






















Chapter 5: Discussion and Conclusion 
The preceding chapter examined five cases in India, each of which has experienced self-
determination movements over the last sixty-six years. It may appear at first glance that no clear 
pattern emerges from these results when we only look at the type of group making the demand 
and the type of demand. However, when we look at the control variables, a different picture 
emerges. We see that when the state is located in an area of geopolitical significance, the 
government always responds with repression. This chapter will attempt to explain the 
significance of the control variables and the type of mechanisms in place in India that allow the 
country to stay intact despite multiple movements, some violent, occurring at any given time. 
In the case of Tamil Nadu, the state does not share a land border with a neighboring 
nation. Nor is there any dispute over the waters of the Indian Ocean that lie between India and 
Sri Lanka. In this case, the government was more open to concession and gave in to the demands 
of creating a separate state. Also significant is the fact that during the time of the Tamil agitation, 
Jawaharlal Nehru was the Prime Minister of India. History has shown that Nehru has been one of 
the most accommodating leaders India has had. In every other case studied, the geographic area 
has been one that shares a land border with a neighboring country – and more significantly, with 
the exception of Mizoram – a neighboring country with which India has an ongoing land dispute. 
Punjab and Kashmir both share borders with Pakistan, a country with which India has a historic 
long-standing enmity. India’s northeastern region, home to the Assam and Bodoland movements 
among others, has been a center of violence, ethnic insurgencies and international interference 
for decades. Not only does the region border China, a hostile neighbor to India, there have been 
reports of external support to insurgencies in the region from Pakistan, Bangladesh, and 
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Myanmar (Lintner, Northeast India: Boiling Pot of International Rivalry 2010). With the 
exception of Mizoram, the central government has repressed every movement in this region.  
As the nation settles into being, India continues to provide a good case to understand how 
the country will deal with separatist movements and more importantly, how it will stay intact as 
a federal republic. As indicated in the literature review, system of “dyarchy” put in place by the 
British, where the traditional rulers of the local provinces were allowed to stay in power as long 
as they paid their dues to the British Crown left a legacy in post-independent India. Rulers such 
as the last Mughal Bahadur Shah Zafar, the Nawabs of Hyderabad, the Scindia dynasty of 
Gwalior, and several other princes collected taxes for the British and paid their dues to them. In 
return, they were allowed limited power over their domains. The Raj needed the cooperation of 
the princes to rule over the vast empire (James 1998). As far back as 1930, there were scholars 
who were questioning the ease with which democracy could be brought to a country as diverse as 
India (Zetland 1930). This becomes important as we understand the political mechanism that was 
put in place post-independence. The legacy of dyarchy and dual role that the British put in place 
set a precedent for post-independence India where loyalty from the states was expected with no 
secession allowed. 
Post-independence India was expected to develop into a mature democracy overnight, a 
process that took years of natural progression in Western nations. According to Baba, there were 
two broad approaches available to new nations – unitarian assimilation or federal 
accommodation. In a unitary state, there may be devolution of power to local governments, but 
the central government has supreme authority. A unitary state requires a certain level of 
homogeneity within and assimilation of the constituent parts. In a federal state, there is a 
distribution of power between the central government and the constituent states or provinces. 
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Unlike the United States, which has a symmetric federal union, India has an assymetric form of 
federalism, where certain sub-units, i.e. states or provinces, have been provided special status 
under the constitution. Article 370 of the constitution, providing special rights to Jammu and 
Kashmir is one such example – Jammu and Kashmir is the only state in the union with its own 
constitution. However, the provisions of Article 370 have been severely curtailed by the central 
government in order to maintain control over the state - leading to human rights violations and a 
state of unrest in Kashmir for the past three decades.  Although there is a clear unitary bias in the 
Indian constitution toward a strong central government, the framers of the constitution 
established it along federal lines (Baba 2011).  
Political mechanisms established in India’s constitution allow for the democracy to 
remain stable despite multiple demands for autonomy. Some answers can be found in the design 
of the Indian federal state. According to Sarkar (2001), the design of Indian democracy has its 
roots as early as 1905, three decades before Indian independence even became a reality. Despite 
the colonial legacy, the roots of Indian democracy lie in Indian nationalism brought about during 
the freedom movement. He asserts that the leaders in India at the time knew that given the 
diversity of the country, a federation was the only viable option as opposed to any form of 
unitary government. In addition, Kohli (2001) contends that India benefited tremendously from 
the presence of the Indian Civil Service and the popularity of the Indian National Congress (or 
Congress) political party. Dasgupta (2001) argues further that the Congress party, though 
hegemonic in many ways and clearly dynastic in its later years, helped balance power between 
the center and the states. His findings are in agreement with Baba (2011) that India’s 
constitution, though heavily centralized, was also adaptable enough to accommodate regional 
concessions such as Article 370 in Kashmir, which allowed for special status for the state. 
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Despite Nehru’s fears, linguistic reorganization of states with devolution of some level of power 
to the states has helped strengthened the federation. In the 1950s and 1960s, after witnessing 
movements in several states, Jawaharlal Nehru foresaw other secessionist demands from 
different parts of the young nation. As a result, the Indian constitution was amended in 1963 to 
include an Anti-Secessionist clause, the purpose of which was to "prevent the fissiparous, 
secessionist tendency in the country engendered by regional and linguistic loyalties and to 
preserve the unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the Indian Union.” (Hardgrave Jr 
1964-1965).  From the point of view of individual states or interest groups, be they religious or 
other ethnic minorities, Manor (2001) asserts that accommodation tactics used by the 
government of India in Tamil Nadu are what helped keep it from escalating into a more 
disastrous and violent movement. According to him, Kashmir and Punjab are examples of when 
violence could have potentially been avoided had early overtures from the moderates of those 
movements toward accommodation been taken seriously by the central government.  
Institutionally, in recent years, India has also put in place very strong local governments. 
Though the power concentration of these local governments is still in the hands of the local 
elites, this has strengthened the legitimacy of the political institutions among the Indian populace 
(Mitra 2001). The nature of multi-party politics in India lends itself to coalition governments and 
the instability that comes with alliances formed at election time in order to govern. Despite this 
instability, India has remained stable as a democracy because of the presence of a strong 
judiciary, a presidency, and the Electoral Commission – the last of these has especially played a 
big role in diminishing some of the damage that might come from instability at the central 
government (Rudolph and Rudolph 2001). In recent years, the single party rule of the Congress 
has all but disappeared with the emergence of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) as a formidable 
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force. Although critics fear the Hindu nationalist rhetoric of the BJP, when in power, the party 
has tended to shift toward a more centrist governing policy.  
When the Indian Constitution came into force in 1950, there were 27 states. When the 
States Reorganization Act was passed in 1956, after some movements based on linguistic 
demands for separate states, there was further reorganization into 14 states and 7 Union 
Territories (Government of India n.d.).  In recent years, there have been new states formed 
within the union, bringing the total to 29 states and 7 Union Territories when the 2011 Census 
was enumerated (Government of India 2011). Many of these states were formed after prolonged 
agitations with varying levels of violence. The state of Jharkhand was carved out of Bihar, and 
Uttarakhand was formed by splitting up Uttar Pradesh in the same year. As of the writing of this 
paper, the most recent development was an agreement made in Andhra Pradesh in 2013 to split it 
into two states - Telengana and Andhra Pradesh.  
In the end, the data suggests that not all demands for more autonomy within the union are 
treated the same, and even in a democracy, repression remains a political tool to influence 
separatists and autonomous movements. While at the same time, the government’s response 
varies despite similar demands from repression to granting full statehood.  Thus as the 
democracy matures over the next few decades, it remains to be seen how borders are re-drawn 
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Map 1.1: India Map: Pre-partition
 









Map 1.2: India Map at partition, 1947 
 






Map 1.3: India Map as of 2012 
  


























Map 4.3 Jammu and Kashmir 
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